Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection
1-16-1958
Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council
Roger J. Traynor
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council 49 Cal.2d 595 (1958).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/423
) 
[L. A. No. 23005. In Bank. Jan. 16, 1958.] 
J. S. GARMON et ai., Respondents, v. SAN DIEGO BUILD-
ING TRADES COUNCIL et al., Appellants. 
[1] Labor-Injunctive Belief-J'urisdiction of State Oourts.-In 
labor disputes involving business enterprises engaged in inter-
state commerce, the power to grant equitable relief by way of 
injunction is beyond the jurisdiction of state courts; Congress 
has occupied the field and, though the federal agency set up 
to adjust a controversy failed to act beoause the interstate 
business involved did not amount to the minimum sum set up 
by such agency, the state courts have DO power to do so, the 
function of filling the gap, insofar as injunctive relief is con-
cerned, being legislative, notjudioial. 
[2] Id.-Remedies-J'urisdictioD.-8tate courts are not foreclosed 
from asserting jurisdiction in an action for damages resulting 
from the tortious conduct of those engaged in a labor dispute 
[1J See Cal.Jur.2d, Labor, § 145 et seq.; Am.Jur., Labor, § 320 
et seq. 
MeR. Dig. References: [1J Labor, § 25; [2, 4, 10] J.abor, § 24; 
[3J Torts, § 2; [5] Labor, § 20a; [6J Labor, § 21; [7] Labor, 
§§ 20a, 21; [8, 9} Labor, § 23. 
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with an employer eugaged in interstate commerce, at least in 
the absence of a conflict between state and federal policies and 
procedural remedies that would result in interference witb uni-
form enforcement of federal law_ 
[3] 'l'orts-DeflnitioD aDd Nature.-Under Civ. Code, 11708, im-
posing on everyone tbe duty lito abstain from· injuring the per-
Bon or property of another, or infringing upon any of his 
rights," there is a breach of such legal duty when one who 
performs an act not authorized by law infringes on a right 
another is entitled to enjoy or causes a substantial material 
loss to another j that breach cODstitutes the eommission of • 
tort for which an action in damages will lie. 
[4] Labor-Remedies-ActioD for Damages.-AD employer who is 
damaged by an unlawful and unauthorized labor practice may 
recover damages in a tort action. 
[6a.6b] Id.-UDions-EcoDomic Pressure ActiTities.-Conduct of 
labor unioDs resulting in a demand OD plaintiffs that they 
execute a eontract which, if executed, would constitute an 
unlawful interference with the bargaining rights of plaintiffs' 
employees was directly contrary to the policy of the state as 
8et forth in Lab. Code, I 923, relating to the freedom of em-
ployees to organize, and constituted an unlawful labor practice. 
[S] Id. - Strikes - Jurisdictional Strikes.-If employees, prefer-
ring to deal directly with their employers pursuant to their 
individual bargaining rights, had exercised their rights and 
chosen to deal with their employers through some committee 
or organization with regard to the concerted activities of a 
labor union demanding that the employers enter into an agree-
ment requiring all their employees to become members of the 
union, they would come directly within the provisions of the 
Jurisdictional Strike Act. (Lab. Code, I§ 1115-1120.) 
['1] Id.-UDions-BcoDomic Pressure Activities: Strikes-Jurisdic-
tiona} Strikes.-Lab. Code, §§ 923 (relating to public policy 
as to labor organizations), 1115-1118 (jurisdictional strikes), , 
are "' pari materia in that they relate to the same general 
8ubject and should be considered together; they represent an 
endeavor on the part of the Legislature to safeguard the 
rights of the individual workman and the employer in the 
field of labor-management relationships. 
[8] Id.-Picketing.-Peaceful picketing is identified with freedom 
of speech as a means by which pickets communicate to others 
the existence of a labor controversy, but this does Dot free 
picketing from all restraint. 
[9] Id.-PicketiDg.":":There may be something more in peaceful 
picketing than free speech, depending on the facts of the case, 
[3] See Oal.Jur., Torts, 51; Am.Jur., Torts, 52 et seq. 
'\ , 
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and conduct in exercise of the asserted right is subject to regu-
lation in accordance with a valid state policy in cases where 
interstate commerce is not involved. 
[10] Id. - Remedies - Jurisdiction.-In an action against unions 
to enjoin picketing and recover damages, the superior court 
had jurisdiction to hear and decide the case as to both issues, 
'and the fact that equitable relief was ultimately denied did 
not destroy the judgment as to the award of damages, though 
the award was below the jurisdictional amount otherwise 
necessary. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County. John A. Hewicker, Judge. Affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
Action against unions to enjoin picketing and to recover 
damages. Judgment for plaintiffs reversed insofar as it 
awarded injunctive relief, and affirmed insofar as it awarded 
damages. 
Todd & Todd, Thomas Whelan, John T. Holt, Clarence E. 
Todd, Walter Wencke, Charles P. Scully, John C. Stevenson, 
Mathew Tobriner and Charles K. Hackler for Appellants. 
Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye, James W. Archer and Ward W. 
Waddell, Jr. for Respondents. 
SHENK, J .-This case is here for the second time. The 
first was on appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court in 
and for the County of San Diego ordering an injunction to 
prevent continuing conduct of the defendants found by the 
court to have been the cause of irreparable damage to the 
property and rights of the plaintiffs, and awarding $1,000 
damages resulting from alleged past tortious activities of the 
defendants. The judgment was affirmed by this court on 
December 2, 1955. (Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades 
Oouncil, 45 Ca1.2d 657 [291 P.2d 1].) On certiorari the 
Supreme Court of the United States ordered that the judg-
ment of this court be .. vacated" and the cause be remanded 
"for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion and thE' 
opinions in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, supra [353 
U.S. 1 (77 S.Ct. 598, 1 L.Ed.2d 601)], and Ama.lgamated Meal 
Outters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., supra [353 U.S 20 (77 S.Ct. 
604, 1 L.Ed.2d 613)]." (Sail Dic!1o Buildin[J Trades Council 
v. J. 8. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 [77 S.Ct. 607. 1 L.Ed.2d 618].) 
) 
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Both the Guss case (Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 
353 U.S. 1 [77 8.Ct. 598, 1 L.Ed.2d 601]) and the Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters case (Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fair-
lawn Meats, 353 U.S. 20 [77S. Ct. 604, 1 L.Ed.2d 613]) were 
decided concurrently with the present case, March 25, 1957. 
They involved the exercise of jurisdiction by state agencies 
over labor disputes which substantially affected interstate 
commerce within the cognizance of the National Labor Re-
lations Act. In the Guss case the Supreme Court held that 
the Utah Labor Relations Board had no jurisdiction to resolve 
a charge of unfair labor practice against an employer when 
the National Labor Relations Board had refused jurisdiction 
on the ground that the employer's operations were "pre-
dominately local in character." The court stated at page 
602 that "the proviso to § 10(a) [formal cession of power 
to state agencies] is the exclusive means whereby States may 
be enabled to act concerning the matters which Congress has 
entrusted to the National Labor Relations Board." In the 
Amalgamated Meat Cutters case the Ohio court of Common 
Pleas asserted jurisdiction in a labor dispute, and the Supreme 
Court stated at page 606 that "If the proviso to § 10(a) ... 
operates to exclude state labor boards from disputes within 
the National Board's jurisdiction in the absence of a cession I 
agreement, it must also exclude state courts." In order that 
the present disposition of this case conform to the decision and 
order of the Supreme Court it is obvious that the judgment 
of the trial court herein, insofar as injunctive relief is con-
cerned, must be reversed. In doing 80 it is deemed desirable 
if not necessary to review to some considerable extent what 
has taken place in the present proceeding. 
As to the facts it appears that the plaintiffs are partners 
engaged in interstate commerce as retail dealers in lumber 
and other building materials; that their employees are not 
members of a labor union and had indicated that they do 
not desire to join, or to be represented by, a union; that 
the defendant unions had not been recognized by the plaintiffs 
nor certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the 
representatives of the plaintiffs' employees; that nevertheless 
the defendants demanded that the plaintiffs enter into an 
agreement which would require that all of the plaintiffs I 
employees be or become members of the defendant unions; 
that upon the plaintiffs' refusal to enter into such an agree-
ment, on the ground that to do so would violate the law, the 
defendants placed pickets at the plaintiffs' place of business, 
) 
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had the plaintiffs' trucks followed, threatened persons about 
to enter the plaintiffs' place of business with economic inter-
ference and injury, and that by such eonduct they induced 
building eontractors to discontinue their patronage. 
The plaintiffs filed a petition with the National Labor 
Relations Board requesting that the question of its employee 
representation be resolved. The board refused to take juris-
diction. The refusal was based on the board's declared policy 
that the annual dollar amount of the plaintiffs' interstate 
business must but did not exceed a minimum set by the board. 
The present proceeding was commenced in the superior eourt 
for an injunction to prevent further alleged tortious eonduct 
on the part of the defendants and for damages. The court 
found on substantial evidence that the intent of the de-
fendants was not to induce the employees to join one of their 
unions, nor to provide education or information as to the 
benefits of organized representation; that their only purpose 
was to compel the plaintiffs to execute the agreement or to 
suffer the destruction of their business. The eourt enjoined 
the unions ". . . from picketing the places of business of 
plaintiffs, from following the tru('ks of the plaintiffs, from pre-
venting or attempting to prevent, by means of threats, ex-
pressed or implied, persons having business with the plaintiffs 
from entering the premises of the plaintiffs, from inducing or 
attempting to induce by such means potential eustomers of 
plaintiffs to refuse to purchase from plaintiffs or to refuse 
to accept delivery of goods from plaintiffs or in plaintiffs' 
trucks, and from doing any other acts tending or intended to 
injure plaintiffs' business. . . ." The court also found that 
the plaintiffs' business had been damaged to the extent of 
$1,000 by the defendants' conduct and as stated, rendered 
judgment for that amount. 
In affirming the judgment this court held that the National 
Labor Relations Board had jurisdiction to prevent unfair 
labor practices against employers engaged in interstate com-
merce; that the conduct on the part of the unions constituted 
unfair labor practices within the meaning of the Labor 
Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C., § 158) ; that in vesting 
in the National Labor Relations Board the discretion to accept 
or refuse jurisdiction of a controversy under section 10 of 
the act Congress must have intended that state courts should 
be free to act where the board had specifically determined, by 
refusing to accept jurisdiction, that the controversy did not 
have a pronounced impact on interstate eommerce; that aI-
) 
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though section 10(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act made pro-' 
vision for the National Labor Relations Board to cede, by 
agreement, jurisdiction to state agencies where the state law 
is not inconsistent with the national labor policy, Congress 
had not, by implication or otherwise, prohibited the state 
from assuming jurisdiction in the absence of such a cession 
and where the National Labor Relations Board had refused 
to take jurisdiction, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to 
injunctive relief and to the damages awarded by the state 
court. 
In arriving at the foregoing conclusions this court took into 
consideration the fact appearing in the record that in the 
administration of the National Labor Relations Act the board 
bad established certain standards as prerequisites to its as-
sumption of jurisdiction. One essential was, of course, that 
the business of the enterprise must atiect interstate commerce 
in a substantial way. But even when so atiected the board's 
announced policy, for budgetary or other reasons, caused it 
to refuse jurisdiction in certain cases. This policy was 
declared by the board in its public announcement of October 
6, 1950, that in order ". . • to better effectuate the purpose 
of the Act, and promote the prompt handling of major cases 
[the Board] has decided not to exercise its jurisdiction to 
the fullest extent possible under the Authority delegated to 
it by Congress, but to limit that exercise to enterprises whose 
operations have, or at which labor disputes would have, a 
pronounced impact upon the interstate flow of commerce 
wherever federal jurisdiction exists under the statute and 
the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution. . . ." 
Among the enterprises excluded were those which did not 
have a "direct inflow of material valued at $500,000 a year" 
or an "indirect inflow of material valued at $1,000,000 a 
year." (26 Labor Relations R~ference Manual 50.) 
The foregoing requirements were not altered by the board 
in a 1954 revision of its standards (34 Labor Relations Refer-
ence Manual 75) and were in force at the time of filing the 
plaintiffs' complaint. Pursuant to the standards set by those 
rules the remedy sought by the plaintiffs was excluded from 
consideration by the board for the reason that only $250,000 of 
the plaintiffs' required business during the preceding year 
was in interstate ..commerce. The plaintiffs were thus denied 
any redress before the board and were so notified. When the 
plaintiffs filed their petition with the board they received a 
reply stating: "The amount of business by Valley Lumber 
) 
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Company [the plaintiffs' business title] in interstate com-
merce is insufficient for the Board to assert jurisdiction on 
the basis of present Board decisions." Later on, after investi-
gation by the regional director of the board, the plaintiffs 
were notified that their petition had been dismissed with the 
statement that" in view of the scope of the business operation 
involved, it would not effectuate the purposes of the National 
Labor Relations Act to institute further proceedings at this 
time .... " 
[1] The present situation of the plaintiffs therefore ap-
pears to be about this: Being in a business affecting interstate 
commerce their remedy by way of injunction is relegated to 
federal law and relief. Because their business in that category 
does not amount to $500,000 per annum they are caught in the 
vacuum. No federal judicial relief can be granted and in this 
"no man's land" no equitable relief can be granted by a 
state court. This unfortunate state of the law is recognized 
by the Supreme Court in both the majority and dissenting 
opinion in the Guss case. It is variously referred to as a 
"vacuum" or "twilight zone" or a "no man's land" in the 
law on account of which parties engaged in interstate com-
merce in a substantial amount but below the standards estab-
lished by the board may not obtain equitable relief in state 
courts or other relief from the National Labor Relations 
Board however disastrously the alleged tortious conduct of the 
defendants may affect the plaintiffs' business. 
We are, therefore, bound to conclude from the decisions 
of the Supreme Court that the plaintiffs are without equitable 
relief under federal law because Congress has occupied the 
field and, although the federal agency set up to adjust the 
controversy has failed to act, the state courts have no power 
to do so. In this connection the Supreme Court declared 
in the Guss case that the function of filling the gap, insofar 
as injunctive relief is concerned, is not judicial but legislative 
and must be performed by congressional enactment. 
Whether the national board has the power to disclaim juris-
diction by a declaration of its policy appears not to have 
been judicially determined. The question was referred to in 
the Guss case by quoting from Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New 
York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767 at page 776 
[67 s.Ct. 1026, 91 L.Ed. 1234] as follows: "The election of 
the National Board to'decline jurisdiction in certain types of 
cases, for budgetary or other reasons presents a different 
problem which we do not now decide." 
) 
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We turn now to the question of damages awarded by the' ~ 
trial court. In remanding the present case the Supreme Court ' 
stated: "Respondents, however, argue that the award of 
damages must be sustained under United Construction Work-
ers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656 [74 s.Ot. 
833, 98 L.Ed. 1025J. We do not reach this question. The 
California Supreme Court leaves us in doubt, but its opinion 
indicates that it felt bound to 'apply' or in some sense follow 
federal law in this case. There is, of course, no such com-
pUlsion. Laburnum sustained an award of damages under 
state tort law for violent conduct. We cannot know that 
the California court would have interpreted its own state law 
to allow an award of damages in this different situation." The 
"different situation" referred to would seem to pose the 
question: Would this court interpret the California law to 
authorize an action for damages for the alleged unlawful 
tortious conduct of the defendants in the absence of violence' 
This question calls for an examination of the approach to the 
problem resulting in our former decision. From that exami-
nation it may be said that both the state and federal laws 
were relied on as establishing actionable conduct. Any dis-
tinction as between those laws was not thoroughly explored. 
It now appears that any reliance on federal law to justify 
the award for damages is not tenable under the facts of 
this case and we should now proceed to determine whether 
the plaintiffs have stated a cause of action for damages on 
account of the alleged past activities on the part of the 
defendants under state law. 
[2] It is apparent from the announcements of the Supreme 
Court as to the limitations on the jurisdiction of a state court 
to grant equitable relief in the solution of labor disputes that 
such courts are not foreclosed from asserting jurisdiction in 
an action for damages resulting from the tortious conduct of 
those engaged in the dispute. If the court had concluded that 
jurisdiction to award damages had been preempted by con-
gressional legislation undoubtedly a declaration to that effect 
would have been forthcoming. In determining the jurisdiction 
intended by Congress to vest in the National Labor Relations 
Board the Supreme Court stated in Garne,. v. Teamsters etc. 
Union, 346 U.s. 485, at page 488 [74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 2281 : 
"The National Labor Management Relations Act, as we have 
before pointed out, leaves much to the states, thOltgh Congress 
has refrained from telling us how much." In view of the 
decisions of the Supreme Court holding that state agencies 
) 
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and courts lack the jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief 
under any circumstances in interstate commerce eases, there 
would seem to be nothing left to the states if their courts are 
also prohibited from making an award for damages in a proper 
case. 
In those cases where the Supreme Court has held that ex-
clusive jurisdiction is vested in the National Labor Relations 
Board it appears without question that the basis of the deci-
sions is the desirability of avoiding such a confict between 
state and federal policies and procedural remedies as would 
result in an interference with uniform enforcement of the 
federal act. In Garnerv. Teamsters etc. Union, supra, 346 
U.S. 485, the court held at page 490 that Congress considered 
that centralization was necessary "to obtain uniform appli-
cation of its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities 
and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local pro-
cedures. . . ." The Garner case involved injunctive relief 
only. In the Laburnum case (United Oonstruction Worker' v. 
Laburnum Oonstruction Oorp., 347 U.S. 656 [74 S.Ct. 838, 
98 L.Ed. 10251) the action was one for compensatory and 
punitive damages arising out of unfair labor practices amount-
ing to tortious conduct. As to the nature of the conduct 
there involved it appeared that agents of the labor unions 
"threatened and intimidated respondent's officers and em-
ployees with violence to such a degree that respondent was 
compelled to abandon all its projects in that area." After 
the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed a modified 
judgment for damages the United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari limited to the following question: ". . . 
does the National Labor Relations Board have exclusive 
jurisdiction over the subject matter so as to preclude the 
State Court from hearing and determining the issues in a 
common-law tort action ba.c;ed upon this conducU" The 
petitioners contended in reliance on the Garner case that the 
federal government occupi~d" the field so completely that 
state courts were "excluded not only from enjoining future 
unfair labor practices ... but that state court.'! are exc1uded 
also from entertaining common-law tort actions for the 
recovery of damages caused by such conduct." The Supreme 
Court rejected this "argument and distinguished the Garner 
case on the ground that the federal legislation was not appli-
cable to damages for tortious conduct and that no interference 
with national policy could arise. The court stated: "In the 
Garner case, Congress had provided a federal administrative 
... ~. 
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remedy, supplemented by judicial procedure for its enforce-
ment, with which the state injunctive procedure conflicted. 
Here Congress has neither provided nor suggested any sub-
stitute for the traditional state court procedure for collecting 
damages for injuries caused by tortious conduct. For US to 
cut off t.he injured respondent from this right of recovery 
will deprive it of its property without recourse or compensa-
tion. To do so will, in effect, grant petitioners immunity from 
liability for their tortious conduct. We see no substantial 
reason for reaching such a result. The contrary view is 
consistent with the language of the Act and there is positive 
support for it in our decisions and in the legislative history 
of the Act." The court then further commented on its 
decision in the Garner case as follows: ., To the extent that 
Congress prescribed preventive procedure against unfair labor 
practices, that case recognized that the Act excluded conflict-
ing state procedure to the same end. To the extent, however, 
that Congress has not prescribed procedure for dealing with 
the consequences of tortious conduct already committed, there 
is no ground for concluding that existing criminal penalties 
or liabilities for tortious conduct have been eliminated. The' 
care we took in the Garner case to demonstrate the existing 
conflict between state and federal administrative remedies 
in that case was, itself, a recognition that if no conflict had 
existed, the state procedure would have survived. The pri-
marily private nature of claims for damages under state 
law also distinguishes them in a measure from the public 
nature of the regulation of future labor relations under 
federal law." 
It is significant that the basis for the decision in the 
Laburnum case is that the remedy in damages for tortious 
conduct there involved did not conflict with federal legisla-
tion. It would seem necessarily to follow that the same 
conclusion would be reached in the case of an action for 
damages for any other tortious conduct which did not so 
conflict. The fact that the particular tort in the Laburnum 
case was said to be a common-law tort, or one involving physi-
cal violence, is, of itself, not controlling. To confine the 
Laburnum case to its own facts would be to completely ignore 
the rationale of the decision. It would require also that we 
ignore the language 'by which the present case was remanded 
for reconsideration. The Supreme Court, after stating that 
"Laburnum was an award of damages under state tort law 
for violent conduct," then invited this court to examine its 
) 
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state law to determine whether a cause of action for damages 
in tort could be maintained under that law in a situation which 
the Supreme Court referred to as "different." Certainly we 
cannot now refuse to apply our law merely because of the 
suggested difference. Again, if it had been the intent of 
the Supreme Court to limit jurisdiction to torts of violence an 
order of reversal and not an order of remand would also seem 
to have been appropriate as the record which that court had 
before it was devoid of any evidence of physical violence on 
the part of the defendants. 
In considering the effect of the Laburnum case we are not 
alone in concluding that it is not to be confined to picketing 
accompanied by acts of violence. Following that decision a 
number of federal and state courts have affirmed judgments 
for damages in cases of tortious conduct differing from that 
in the Laburnum case but well within the rationale of that 
case. Most significant are those cases wherein, like the present 
one, only peaceful picketing was involved. In Denver etc. 
Counc~i v. Shore, 132 Colo. 187 [287 P.2d 267], it was claimed 
that the Laburnum case was distinguishable on the ground that 
violence was there involved. The Colorado Supreme Court 
held that this "is scarcely a proper basis for distinction as it 
goes not to the principle involved, but only to the enent of 
damage that might be properly determinable. Admitting 
that in the Laburnum case the tort was excessive and that 
in the present case it was mild and devoid of any rowdyism, 
nevertheless, in either case a recovery in damages for injury 
done on account of the illegal practice is necessarily upon the 
basis of tort." (See also Benz v. Campania Naviera Hidalgo, 
S. A., 353 U.S. 138 [77 S.Ct. 699, 1 L.Ed.2d 709]; Dallas 
General Drivers v. Wamix, Inc., of Dallas, (Tex.Civ.App.) 
281 S.W.2d 738, 745; Benjamin v. Foidl, 379 Pa. 540 [109 
A.2d 300, 301] ; International Sound Technicians v. Superior 
Court, 141 Cal.App.2d 23 [296 P.2d 395] ; Selchow & Righter 
Co. v. Damino, 146 N.Y.S.2d 874.) 
In accordance with the views expressed by the Supreme 
Court in the Laburnum case, and the court's reference thereto 
in remanding the present case, the question next for consider-
ation is whether the alleged conduct of the defendants was 
unlawful under the laws of this state and an actionable tort 
within the jurisdiction of its courts. If the purpose of the 
defendants' picketing was unlawful under the state law the 
case cannot be distinguished from the Laburnum case and 
) 
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the other state and federal eases to the same effect as to 
the jurisdictional issue. 
[S] The law of this state imposes upon everyone the duty 
"to abstain from injuring the person or property of another, 
or infringing upon any of his rights." (Civ. Code, § 1708.) 
There is a breach of such legal duty when one who performs 
an act not authorized by law infringes upon a right another 
is entitled to enjoy, or causes a substantial material loss to 
another. That breach constitutes the commission of a tort, 
under the laws of this state, for which an action in damages 
will lie. In Loup v. Califorftia 8. B. B. Co., 63 Cal. 97, it was 
said at page 99: " A person commits a tort, and renders him-
self liable to an action for damages, who commits some act not 
authorized by law, or who omits to do something which he 
ought to do by law, and by such an act or omission either 
infringes some absolute right, to the enjoyment of which 
another is entitled, or causes to such other some substantial 
loss of money, health, or material comfort." (See also 24 
Cal.Jur. 589.) [4] It is further established in this state 
that by an unlawful and unauthorized labor practice an em-
ployer who is damaged thereby may recover damages in a t.ort 
action. In James v. Marinship Corp.,25 Ca1.2d 721 [155 P.2d 
329, 160 A.L.R. 900], it was said that the "object of con· 
certed labor activity must be proper and that it must be 
sought by lawful means, otherwise the persons injured ... may 
obtain damages ... (Citations.)" (See also Park ct T. I. 
Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 27 Ca1.2d 
599, 603 [165 P.2d 891, 162 A.L.R. 1426].) 
There is then the further question whether the objective of 
the defendant unions was a proper and lawful one. Section 
923 of the Labor Code, as enact.ed in 1933 (Stats. 1933, p. 
1(78) and reenacted in 1937 (Stats. 1937, p. 208), provides 
as follows: "In the interpretation and application of this 
chapter, the public policy of this State is declared as follows: 
Negotiations of terms and conditions of labor should result 
from voluntary agreement between employer and employees . 
. . . [I]t is necessary that the individual workman have full 
freedom of association, self·organization, and designation of 
representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and 
conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from 
the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, 
or their agents, in the designation of such rcpTt'sentativt's or 
in self·organization or in other concerted activities fOT the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
) 
) 
) 
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tection. " Section 1667 of the Civil Code, enacted in 1872, 
provides: "That is not lawful which is: ... Contrary to the 
policy of express law though not expressly prohibited. . . ." 
[5a] In the present case the court found, in accordance with 
the allegations of the complaint, that in order to achieve an 
unlawful objective the defendants had made a demand on the 
plaintiffs that they execute the contract and concluded that the 
demand, if complied with, would constitute an unlawful inter-
ference with the bargaining rights of the plaintiffs' employees. 
Such conduct on the part of the defendants was directly 
contrary to the policy of the state as set forth in section 923 
of the Labor Code above quoted. The trial court correctly 
concluded from the evidence that by their demand the de-
fendants sought to require the plaintiffs to interfere with the 
bargaining rights of their employees and force upon them 
terms and conditions of their employment and labor repre-
sentation not of their own choosing and which in fact they 
had rejected. If the plaintiffs had acceded to the demand 
of the defendants a definite case of coercion on the part of 
the plaintiffs with respect to the bargaining rights of their 
employees, contrary to law, would have been accomplished. 
After the decision of this court in McKay v. Retail Auto. 
S. L. Union No. 1067, 16 Ca1.2d 311 [106 P.2d 373], the 
Legislature in 1947 enacted the Jurisdictional Strike Act. 
(Stats. 1947, pp. 2952-53.) That enactment is incorporated 
in the Labor Code as sections 1115 to 1120 inclusive. Section 
1118 defines a jurisdictional strike not only as a "concerted 
refusal to perform work for an employer" but also as "any 
other concerted interference with an employer's operation or 
business, arising out of a controversy between two or more 
labor organizations as to which of them has or should have 
the exclusive right to bargain collectively with an employer 
on behalf of his employees or any of them, or arising out of a 
controversy between two or more labor organizations as to 
which of them has or should have the exclusive right to have 
its members perform wo·rk for an employer." Section 1115 
states that a jurisdictional strike" as herein defined is hereby 
declared to be against the public policy of the State of Cali. 
fornia and is hereby declared to be unlawful." Section 1116 
provides that" any person injured or threatened with injury 
by violation of any of the provisions hereof shall be entitled 
to injunctive relief therrfrorn in a proper case and to recover . 
any damages resulting therefrom in any court of competent 
) 
) 
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jurisdiction. ". Section 1117 defines a "Labor organization 
as IC any agency or employee representation committee or aD)' 
local unit thereof in which employees participate, and exists 
for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers 
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, hours of employ-
ment or conditions of work. . .• As used herein, 'person' 
means any person, association, organization, partnership, cor-
poration, unincorporated association, or labor organization." 
[6] In the present case it does not appear clearly whether 
the plaintiffs' employees had or had not selected a' committee . 
or unit or other agency for the purpose of collective bargain~' 
mg. However, it does appear that they preferred to deal 
directly with their employers pursuant to their individual 
bargaining rights. If they had exercised their rights under 
the law and chosen to deal with their employers through some 
committee or organization they would have come directly 
within the provisions of the Jurisdictional Strike Act. 
['1] The foregoing provisions of the Labor Code, that is, 
sections 923 and 1115 through 1118, are in pari materia in that 
they relate to the same general subject and should be consid-
ered together. They all represent an endeavor on the part of 
the Legislature to safeguard the rights of the individual work-
man and the employer in this important field of labor-manage-
ment relationships. 
The question of the constitutionality of the provisions of 
the Jurisdictional Strike Act came before this court in Setleft 
Up etc. Co. v. Grocery etc. Union (1953),40 Cal.2d 368 [254 
P.2d 544, 33 A.L.R.2d 327]. By the complaint the plaintUf 
sought an injunction and damages for the alleged unlawful 
conduct of the defendants. At the trial the defendants ob-
jected to the introduction of any evidence on the ground that 
the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a 
cause of action. The objection was sustained and from a 
judgment dismissing the action an appeaJ was taken. It was 
contended by the defendant unions that the act was unconsti-
tutional on the ground that under the guaranties of freedom 
-Federal legislation to the same effect ill found in leetion 303(a)(4) 
(19 U;B.C.A., t187fa)[4] of the Labor Management Relation. Act «(11 
Stat. 158) prohibiting jurisdirtional .trikes, and .actioD S03(b) (29 
U.B.C.A., .187[bJ) authorizes an aetion for damages for violation 
thereof. A judgment for damages for violation of that provisioD waR 
rendered by the District Court for the Territory of Alaska, a1Iirmed by 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (lntetflotionol 1,OfIg,hore· 
.etl'6, eto. 17tl\(m v. JUtl6GU Spruce COTp., 189 F.2d 177), and a1Iirmed 
b7 the Supreme Court in 1952 (Intcrnotio'IIQl l.ong8l1oremefl " eto. U.w. 
Y. /fIIIIMIIj BfWVOf COflI., 342 U.B. 237 (72 B.Ct. 235, 116 L.Ed. 2711]). 
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of speech "the picketing was lawful, and the act, therefore, 
in condemning concerted interference with the employer's 
business, is invalid, because it deprives them of the right to 
engage in lawful concerted action, that is, peaceful picketing; 
that such activity does not create a 'clear and present danger' 
justifying a restraint on the freedoms mentioned." 
By unanimous opinion of this court it was held that the 
legislation under attack did not infringe upon the constitu-
tional rights of free speech. There was no allegation in the 
complaint that interstate commerce was involved. [8] It 
was point.ed out. that. although "Peaceful picketing has been 
identified with freedom of speech -a means by which the 
pickets communicate to others the existence of a labor con-
troversy," nevertheless the identification of peaceful picketing 
with freedom of speech did "not free the concerted activity 
of picketing from all restraint." (See also Northwestern Pac. 
B. B. Co. v. Lumber ~ S. W. Union, 31 Cal.2d 441 [189 
P.2d 277J.) 
[5b] Based on the foregoing provisions of the statutory law 
of this state and the finding and conclusion of the trial court, 
which is amply supported by the evidence, that the only pur-
pose of the defendants' activities was to compel the plaintiffs 
to execute the proposed agreement, we are bound to conclude 
that the conduct of the defendants constituted an unlawful 
labor practice contrary to and in violation of the laws of this 
state. 
Apart from the question of the existence of an actionable 
. tort based upon an unlawful labor practice under state law 
is the question whether any limitation placed on peaceful 
picketing constitutes an undue interference with personal 
liberties protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
After the decisions of the Supreme Court in the Guss case, 
in the Amalgamated Meat Cutters case, and in this case, all 
on March 25, 1957, the Supreme Court in International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. "fogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 [77 S.Ot. 
1166, 1 L.Ed.2d 1347J (June 17, 1957) entered upon an 
extensive review of its decisions involving peaceful picketing. 
It was there said at page 1166: .. This is one more in the long 
series of cases in which this Court has been required to 
consider the limits imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment 
on the power of a State to enjoin picketing." After review-
ing those cases the court stated at page 1171 : "This series of 
cases, then, established a broad field in which a State, in 
• C.Id-IIO 
) 
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enforcing some public po1i('y, whether of its criminal or its 
civil law, and whrthrr anllounced by its legislature or it.s 
courts, could constitutionall~' enjoin peaceful picketing aimed 
at preventing effectuation of tl111t policy." Among those local 
policies which the ('()llrt drl'll1l'd to be proper objectives for 
state action was thnl which, 8H in the present case, made il 
unlawful to coerce 1111 employer to put pressurr on his em, 
ployees to join a pal'li('ular I1llioll, The courl commented on 
Pappa.s v. Stacel/. };)] Me. 36 [116 A.2d 497], where it 
appeared that unioll t'lllployrPR picketed a restaurant peace· 
fully "for thr sole purpose of seeking to organize other em· 
ployees of the Plaintiff. ultimately to have the Plaintiff enter 
into collective barf!uilling and negotiations with the Union, 
... " The Maine Snprrme .Tudicial Court had drawn an infer· 
ence from an agrerd statement of facts that "there is a steady 
and exacting pressurl' upon the employer to interfere with the 
free choice of thf' t'lIlployees in the matter of organi7-ation. 
To say that the pil'kl'ting is not designed to bring about such 
action is to forget all obvious purpose of picketing-to cause 
economic loss to till' business during noncompliance by the 
employees with thr l't'quests of the union," The trial court 
held the conduct to tlt' in violation of a Maine statute which 
provided as follow~: "Workers shall have full freedom of 
association, self org1mization and designation of representa-
tives of their own rhl"lOSing for the purpose of negotiating the 
terms and condition~ of their employment or other mutual aid 
or protection, free fl'l.)m interference, restraint or coercion by 
their employers or other persons .... " (P .L. 1941, ch. 292; 
RS., ch. 30, § 15 (1!)~!') The United States Supreme Court 
dismissed an appeal in the St8Cf'Y (,Jlse because it presented no 
substantial federal «I1leStion, (Stacey v. Pappas, 350 U.S. 
870 [76 S.Ct. 117, }(\) L.Ed. 7701.) The Vogt case presented 
a similar problem ftlh:! v;hiIe thf' Supreme Court said that it 
"might well have M::ied cF.Ttiorari on the strength of our l 
decision" in the Stat"tY ea"e it ne\'ertheless "thought it advis-
able to grant certion--i , . , and to restate the principles gov-
erning this type of ('.I;5e." 
In the Vogt case, a!- i!I tb .. Stacey case, the problem involved 
pressurr brought to Na: Ile~inst an employer through peaceful, 
picketing in an attf'illPt to ~rce him to influence his em-; 
ployees to join a l~h~ arg-anization. The Supreme Court of. 
Wisconsin had stat,,! ili- "On .. would be credulous indeed· 
to believe under tht eirr:uns~ances that the Union had no· • 
thought of coercin& the employer to interfere with its em-I,~ 
,:t;\} 
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ployees in their right to join or refuse to join the defendant 
Union." As in the Stacey ease the Wisconsin court held that 
such picketing was for an unlawful purpose and in violation 
of a Wisconsin statute which made it an unlawful labor 
practice for an employee individually or in concert with other!! 
to "coerce, intimidate or induce any employer to interfer!' 
with any of his employes in the enjoymt'nt of their legal 
rights ... or to engage in any practice with regard to hi!': 
employes which would constitute an unfair labor practice 
if undertaken by him on his own initiative." (Wis. Stat., 
§ 111.06 (2) (b).) In the Vogt case the Supreme Court, again 
referring to the Stacey case said: "The Stacey case is thiR 
case ... As in Stacey, the highest state court [of Wisconsin 1 
drew the inference from the facts that the picketing was to 
coerce the employer to put pressure on his employees to join 
the union, in violation of the declared policy of the State. 
(For a declaration of similar congressional policy, see § 8 of 
the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 140,29 U.S.O. § 158,29 U.S.O.A. 
§ 158.) The eases discussed above all hold that, consistent 
with the Fourteenth Amendment, a State may enjoin such 
conduct." (See also United Assn. of Plumbers etc. Union v. 
Graham, 345 U.S. 192 [73 S.Ct. 585, 97 L.Ed. 946] ; Building 
Seroice etc. Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 [70 8.Ct. 784. 
94 L.Ed. 1045].) 
The present case is the same in all essential respects as 
the Stacey and Vogt cases, ~th the single exception that 
in those cases interstate commerce was not involved and thus 
the question of encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Na-
tional LaboT Relations Board was not at issue. However, 
those considerations which go to the existence of a cause of 
action for tortious conduct in violation of the declared policy 
of a state are the same. Not only are the declared policies 
of Maine and Wisconsin identical in all material aspects ~th 
the law of California, but the manner in which those laws were 
violated and thus gave rise to 'an actionable tort cannot be 
distinguished. . 
The United States Supreme Court, in its majority opinion 
in the Vogt case, pointed out that there had thus been a 
gradual transition from tht' premise that peaceful picketing 
was an absolute right {see Tknrnht'll v. Alabama (1939), 310 
U.S. 88 [60 8.0t. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093]), and that it is now 
universally recognized that thl're is something more in peace-
ful picketing than merely the communication of ideas or free 
speech entitled ~thout qualification to Fil'St Amendment pro-
) 
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teetion. (See Bake'1/ ct P. Driver, efo. Looal. v. WohZ, 815 '~ 
U.S. 769, 776-777 [62 8.0t. 816, 86 L.Ed. 11781.) The court 
in the Vogt case noted that the cases in this field disclosed •• an' 
evolving, not a static, course of decision," and that the doc-
trine of a particular case "is not allowed to end with its ' 
enunciation .... " It traced the evolution of the law in this 
field from the Thornhill case which had been deemed to accord 
to peaceful picketing unqualified First Amendment protec-
tion, to its present holding that the intervening cases "estab-
lished a broad field in which a State, in enforcing some public , 
policy ... could constitutionally enjoin peaceful picketing ... ~ 
aimed at preventing effectuation of that policy." ": 
Mr. Justice Douglas in the dissenting opinion in the Vogt 
case summarized the evolution of the court's decisions dealing 
with the legal principles here involved since the Thornhill 
case. In criticizing the majority opinion he said that "The . 
Court has now come full circle"; that the "retreat began 
when, in International Brotherhood of Teamster" C. W. ct" 
H. Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470' [70 S.Ct. '173, 94 L.Ed. 995, .~, 
13 A.L.R.2d 631], four members of the Court announced that " 
all picketing could be prohibited if a state court decided that ' 
that picketing violated the State's public policy. The retreat 
became a rout in Local Union No. 10, United .A880. J. P. ct 8. 
v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 [73 8.0t. 585, 97 L.Ed. 946]. It was 
only the 'purpose' of the picketing which was relevant. . .• ' 
Today, the Court signs a formal surrender ... State courts 
and state legislatures are free to decide whether to permit 
or suppress any particular picket line for any reason other 
than a blanket policy against all picketing." 
[9] The majority of the Supreme Oourt by its latest deci-
sions has thus defined and clarified the limitations which a 
state may constitutionally place upon peaceful picketing con-
ducted in the asserted exercise of the right of free speech as 
contemplated by the First and Fourteeenth Amendments. 
That court has unequivocally held that there may be some-
thing more in peaceful picketing than free speech, depending 
on the facts of the case, and that conduct in the exercise of 
the asserted right is subject to regulation in accordance with 
a valid state policy in cases where interstate commerce is not 
involved. 
In view of the development and recent clarification of the 
law in this field we are requested to reconsider the case of 
McKay v. Retail ~ttfo. 8. L. Union No. 1067, supra, 16 Ca1.2d 
311. That case in legal contemplation is similar to the present 
/) 
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ease but there was no showing there that the employer cor· 
poration wa.c; engaged in interstate commerce and there was 
no request for damages. It appeared, however, that the con-
troversy was between two labor organizations as to which had 
"or should have the exclusive right to have its members per-
form work for an employer." (Lab. Code, § 1118.) The 
picketing was peaceful. The employer took no part in the 
controversy. It could not, under the law, interfere. It was 
caught in the middle and according to the admitted facts 
"the continuance of the picket lines [had] the effect of elosing 
down the company's plant, stopping all work therein and 
destroying its said business." 
The McKay ease was decided on Oetober 14, 1940. It was 
held that the picketing without violence there engaged in 
was entitled to protection under the federal constitutional 
right of freedom of speech. This declaration was made not-
withstanding the provisions of section 923 of the Labor Code, 
adopted in 1938, declaring the policy of the state and above 
quoted. That section was referred to in the majority opinion 
but only as to its ineffectiveness as against the constitutional 
rights of the defendants. 
We deem it unnecessary to reconsider the McKay ease for 
the reason that the result sought by the request has already 
been accomplished, first, by the enactment by the Legislature 
of the Jurisdictional Strike Act in 1947 making the activities 
of the defendants in the McKay ease unlawful with redress 
by way of injunctive relief and damages; secondly by the 
decision of this court in the first Seven Up ease in 1958 (8e11en 
Up etc. Co. v. Grocery etc. Union, supra, 40 Cal.2d 368) i 
establishing the constitutionality of that act as valid state : 
law, and finally by the Supreme Court of the United States . 
in the Vogt case (International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
Vogt, Inc. [June, 1957], supra, 77 S.Ct. 1166) in affirming 
jurisdiction in the state court to enforce such a state policy 
either by injunction or damages, or both, when interstate 
commerce is not involved. The McKay case, on its facts, would 
fall within the regulatory provisions of the Jurisdictional 
Strike Act, later enacted. It was undisputed in that case 
that the controversy was between two labor organizations. 
The effect of later statutes and decisions on that ease may 
well be left for further judicial consideration when the same 
or similar facts are 'presented. 
It would also serve no useful purpose to review the numerous 
other decisions of this court cited by the parties and prior 
614 GARMON tI. SAN DIEGO BLDG. TRADES COUNcn. [49 C.2d 
to the latest expressions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in clarifying the decisional and other law in this field 
of labor-management relations, and in making clear the extent 
of the power of the state courts to exercise jurisdiction in 
proper cases, both in law and in equity. Those decisions have 
bet'n superseded, in many respects, by later law both statutory 
and decisional. To engage in the task of distinguishing and 
discussing them now would be a work of supererogation. 
Whether they are or are not consistent with present law may 
also be more appropriately pointed out as questions with 
reference thereto are presented. 
[10] The defendants contend that the trial court was with-
out jurisdiction to award damages in this case for the reason 
that the amount of the damages alleged and awarded was less 
than the amount necessary to confer superior court jurisdic-
tion. The complaint alleged past damages in the sum of $750 
and future damages in the sum of $150 a day in addition to 
the loss of contracts. Irreparable injury was alleged. Both 
injunctive relief and damages in the sum of $1,000 were 
awarded. The court correctly assumed jurisdiction to hear 
and decide the case as to both issues. The fact that equitable 
relief is ultimately denied does not destroy the judgment as 
to the award of damages even though the award was below 
the jurisdictional amount otherwise necessary. In Siltlerman 
v. Greenberg,12 Cal.2d 252, it was said at page 254 [83 P.2d 
293]: "The allegations of the pleading and the relief sought 
established the character of the action. The fact that it was 
substantially of an equitable as well as of a legal nature 
invested the superior court with jurisdiction to hear and 
determine the entire cause, and that jurisdiction was not di· 
vested by the subsequent denial of equitable relief. The 
court of equity having once obtained jurisdicti()n, properly re-
tained the case and decided the whole controversy between the 
parties. For a complete discussion of this subject see Becker v. 
Superior Court, supra {l51 Cal. 313 (90 P. 689)]; also 
Cook v. WinkZepZeck, supra, [16 Ca1.App.2d Supp. 759, 763 
(59 P.2d 463)] and cases there cited." 
There is substantial evidence to support the amount of 
damages awarded. 
In summary, it is concluded that the injunctive relief sought 
by the plaintiffs is not, under the facts of this case, within 
the juriRdiction of the superior court to grant; that the policy 
declared by the Legislature of the state concerning coercive 
conduct between employer and employee as to whether the 
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employee should or should not join a particular union is a 
valid state policy and activities contrary thereto are unlaw-
ful; that such policy is in all essential respects the same as 
that declared by the legislatures of Maine and Wisconsin and 
held to be valid in the Stacey case (Stacey v. Pappas, supra, 
350 U.S. 870) and the Vogt case (International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., supra, 77 S.Ct. 1166) respectively; 
that, as in those cases, such policy is violated by bringing 
pressure to bear against an employer to coerce his employees 
to join or not to join a particular union; that the conduct 
of the defendants in the present case was contrary to that 
policy and for that reason unlawful and tortious; that the 
plaintiffs were entitled to maintain this action for damages 
resulting therefrom, and that the trial court had jurisdiction 
to award such damages. These conclusions are deemed to be 
consistent with the opinion and order of the Supreme Court in 
remanding this proceeding. 
The judgment, insofar as it awards injunctive relief, is 
reversed. Insofar as it awards damages to the plaintiffs the 
judgment is affirmed, with costs to neither party in the 
present proceeding. 
Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
The United States Supreme Court remanded this case for 
a determination of the question whether plaintiffs have a 
cause of action under state law. The majority of this court 
now state that it is apparent from the remand that restrictions 
on the power of state courts to enjoin conduct that is an unfair 
labor practice are not applicable to an action for damages, 
and that if we did not have power to award damages, the 
Supreme Court would no doubt have so declared rather than 
remanded the case. The remand cannot bear such a con-
struction. In its opinion, the Supreme Court specifically 
states that it does not reach the question whether an award 
of damages can be sustained under United ConstrucNon W ork-
ers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656 [74 S.Ct. 
833, 98 L.Ed. 1025]. The court did not find it necessary to 
decide this question since onr earlier opinion in the ease 
did not stat.e whether plaint.iffs have a cau!>e of action under 
state law. If no cause of action for damages exists nnder 
state law, it is of course immaterial whether the policy of 
the federal statute does or does not permit the enforcement 
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of such a cause of action in the state courts. The Supreme 
Court, pursuing its usual policy of judicial economy, declined 
to answer a problem when an answer was not strictly com-
pelled. Whatever we may think of the wisdom of this policy, 
considering the burden it places on litigants and the lower 
courts, it furnishes a complete explanation for the remand 
in the present case. Except insofar as earlier decisions of 
the Supreme Court provide guidance, the question is still 
open whether a state court has jurisdiction to award damages 
in the kind of case now before us. 
Soon after Garner v. Teamsters etc. Union, 346 U.S. 485 
[74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 228], the Supreme Court qualified 
the broad rule of that case in United Construction Workers v. 
Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656 [74 S.Ct. 833, 
98 L.Ed. 1025). There the defendants employed threats of 
violence and an armed mob in an effort to compel the plain-
tiff to recognize them as the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive of its employees. The Supreme Court upheld state court 
jurisdiction to award damages for the injury to the em-
ployer's business resulting from such conduct, in spite of 
the assumption that it was also an unfair labor practice 
under section 8(b) (1). (29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1).) 
Language in the opinion suggested that jurisdiction to apply 
state law was preserved because the plaintiff sought damages 
rather than an injunction and that the case was distinguishable 
from the Garner case because there state law attempted to 
provide a preventive remedy paralleling the preventive remedy 
available under federal law, whereas "here Congress has 
neither provided nor suggested any substitute for the tradi. 
tional state court procedure for collecting damages for injuries 
caused by tortious conduct." (347 U.S. at 663-664.) Some 
state and federal cases have relied on this distinction in 
holding that damages may be awarded under state law for 
conduct markedly different from that in the Laburnum case. 
(Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., [9th Cir.], 233 
F.2d 62, 65-66, rev'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 138 [77 S.Ct. 
699, 1 L.Ed.2d 709] [peaceful picketing constituting tort un-
der Oregon law] ; Denver Bldg. &: Constr. Trades Council v. 
Shore, 132 Colo. 187, 196-197 [287 P.2d 267] [peaceful pick-
eting in violation of Colorado Labor Peace Act] ; Benjamin v. 
Foidl, 379 Pa. 540 [109 A.2d 300] [common-law conspiracy 
to deprive of employment] ; Dallas General Drivers v. Wamix, 
Inc. (Tex.Civ.App.), '281 S.W.2d 738, 745-746, aff'd on other 
grounds, -- Tex. - [295 S.W.2d 873] {peaceful picket-
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ing and secondary boycott in violation of Texas antitrust 
and antimonopoly statutes] ; see International Soutld Techni-
Cia?IS v. Superior Oourt, 141 Cal.App.2d 23, 29-32 [296 P.2d 
395] ; New York, New Haven if Hartford R. R. v. Jenkins, 331 
Mass. 720, 734-735 [122 N.E.2d 759], rev'd sub nom. Local 
25, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. New York, New 
Haven if Hartford R. R., 350 U.S. 155 [76 8.Ct. 227, 100 L.Ed. 
166] ; Selchow if Righter 00. v. Damino, 146 N.Y.S.2d 874, 
876-877 [Sup.Ct.].) 
Relying on this same analysis, other courts in actions by 
employees against unions have refused to award damages 
under state law on the ground that the National Labor Rela-
tions Board was empowered to give substantially the same 
relief under federal law by a back pay order. (Born v. Laube, 
214 F.2d 349, denying rehearing in 213 F.2d 407 [9th Cir.], 
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 855 [75 8.Ct. 80, 99 L.Ed. 674] ; Sterling 
v. Local 438, Liberty Assn. of Steam if Power Pipe Pitters, 
207 Md. 132, 144-146 [113 A.2d 389], cert. denied, 350 U.S. 
875 [76 S.Ct. 119, 100 L.Ed. 773], motion for leave to file 
petition for writ of prohibition denied, 351 U.S. 917 [76 S.Ct. 
708,100 L.Ed. 1450) ; Real v. Ourran, 285 App.Div. 552, 553-
555 [138 N.Y.S.2d 809] ; Mahoney v. Sailors' Union, 45 Wn.2d 
453, 460-461 [275 P.2d 440), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 915 [75 
S.Ct. 604, 99 L.Ed. 1249].) 
Still other courts have held that damages may be given 
under state law in cases involving violence, apparently singling 
it out as the critical factor distinguishing the Laburnum case 
from the Garner case. (International Longshoremen', etc. 
Union v. Hawaiian Pineapple 00., 226 F.2d 875, 883 [9th 
Cir.], em. denied, 351 U.S. 963 [100 L.Ed. 1483, 76 8.et. 
1026] ; Iftternational Union, United Automobile Workers v. 
Russell, 264 Ala. 456 [88 So.2d 175, 180-182], cert. granted, 
352 U.S. 915 [77 S.Ct. 213, 1 L.Ed.2d 121] ; Tallman 00. v. 
Latal, 365 Mo. 552 [248 S.W.2d 547, 550-553]; see Interna-
tional Union of Electrical etc. Workers v. Underwood Oorp., 
[2d Cir.1, 219 F.2d 100, loi n. 3; but see Benz v. Oompania 
Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., [9th Cir.] , 233 F.2d 62, 66, rev'd on 
other grounds, 353 U.S. 138 [77 S.Ct. 699, 1 L.Ed.2d 709].) 
Under this analysis the reasons justifying jurisdiction to award 
damages would be substantially the same as those that justify 
state injunctive relief in cases of violence. (See 54 Columb.L. 
Rev. 1147, 1148.) It might seem self-evident, however, even in 
the absence of the Laburnum case, that if local interest in keep-
ing public order is sufficient to preserve injunctions. under 
) 
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state law, it is sufficient to preserve the less drastic remedy 
of damages. 
A third possible basis for distinction might be found in the 
court's constant reiteration in its opinion that recovery is 
grounded on a common-law, apparently as distinguished from 
a statutory, tort. (See Friendly Society of Engravers v. 
Calico Engraving Co., [4th Cir.], 238 F.2d 521, 524.) Why 
this distinction is relevant to the state's right to grant relief 
is not clear, unless it suggests a difference between state law,," 
of general application and laws aimed specifically at labor 
relations. (See Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Rela· 
tions,67 Harv.L.Rev. 1297, 1321-1324.) 
When the Laburnum case is read against the background 
of the Garner case, it is clear that these factors are not them· 
selves the ultimate tests of state court jurisdiction to apply 
state law, but indications of whether or not there is a likeli· 
hood of conflict between state and federal policy. The possi· 
bility of conflict of policies, pointed up in the Garner case. 
remains the principal consideration, whether damages or in· 
junctive relief, violence or peaceful picketing, common-law 
or statutory rights to recovery are involved. 
Thus, if there is a conflict between state and federal sub· 
stantive rules in terms of conduct condemned or protected. 
state law must of course give way no matter what remedy it 
provides. Likewise, even if state and federal laws have an 
appearance of harmony, as applied by different tribunals they 
may become inconsistent and federal policy indirectly 
thwarted. This potential inconsistency was the consideration 
that lay behind the Garner decision and prompted the state· 
ment that, "A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of 
procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or con· 
flicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive 
law." (346 U.S. at 490-491.) The notion of "conflicting 
remedies" is a shorthand way of pointing up this potential 
conflict in the application of substantive policies. Conversely, 
the conclusion that there is no "conflict of remedies" would 
seem to indicate that the different substantive rules as applied 
by different tribunals will not conflict in terms of conduC1 
condemned or protected, and that once this absence of con· 
flict is assured, federal law does not envisage its preventivi' 
remedy as necessarily the only one available to an injured 
party. (See 53 Mich.L.Rev. 602, 606·609.) 
The Laburnum case illustrates this last situation. Therp 
was no conflict between the federal and state substantive rules 
y 
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because the conduct was a tort under Virginia law and an 
unfair labor practice under the federal statute. There could 
be no conflict in the application of these rules because of the 
violent nature of the conduct involved, an element whose 
presence is underlined by the later description of the Labur· 
num case in the Weber opinion. (348 U.S. at 477.) The 
Supreme Court's decision in the present case, in stating that 
"Laburnum sustained an award under state tort law for 
violent conduct," whereas the present case involves a .. differ· 
ent situation," further emphasizes the importance of violence 
in Laburnum, and that the rule of that case cannot be auto-
matically extended to aU awards of damages. The examples 
drawn by the court in the Laburnum case from legislative 
history to support the survival of state remedies all include 
references to violence (347 U.S. at 668-669), and the court's 
review was specifically restricted to the question of state juris-
diction •• in view of the type of conduct found by the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia .... " (347 U.S. at 658.) The 
type of conduct gave assurance that in no event would federal 
policy be expounded by the board to condone that which the 
state there condemned. 
This assurance was strengthened by the fact that the state 
,'-as enforcing a law of general application rather than one 
aimed specifically at labor relations; from Virginia's point of 
view it was irrelevant that the defendant.s were labor organi-
zations. Although this consideration is evidently not decisive 
(see Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 479 [75 
S.Ct. 480, 99 L.Ed. 546]), its importance is made clear in the 
last paragraph of the opinion where it is said that, "If 
petitioners were unorganized privat.e persons, conductinll 
t.hemselves as did petitioners here, Virginia would have hall 
undoubted jurisdiction of this action against them. The fact 
that petitioners are labor organizations ... provides no reason· 
able basis for a different conclusion." (347 U.S. at 669.) 
Finally, since the stat~ sought to compensate for a com· 
pleted wrong rather than parallel the preventive remedy avail· 
able through the board, the danger of conflict with federal 
policy was further reduced. However. since damages are a 
means of enforcing policy and controlling conduct, althouJ!h 
somewhat less direct than an injun('tion, the form of fhl' 
remedy alone would not seem to he the eon!!iileration detrr. 
mining whether stat.e law may conflict with f('o('ral la,v. 
It is readily apparent that the present case provides no such 
assurance that there will not be conflict between state and 
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federal laws as applied. Defendants engaged in peaceful 
picketing, not threats and violence i their conduct was not of 
a type that gives any assurance how the National Labor 
Relations Board would view it under section 8 (b), or that the 
board might not find it a protect~d activity under section 7. 
Furthermore, if recovery were permitted under state law, 
it would be based, not on law of general application, but on law 
aimed specifically at labor relations. 
Section 303(b) (29 U.S.C. § 187 (b», gives a right of action 
for damages to any person injured by certain secondary boy-
cott activities described in section 303(a). (29 U.S.C. § 187 
(a).) Damages can be awarded under this section by any 
court that has jurisdiction of the parties, without a prior 
determination by the National Labor Relations Board that 
there has been an unfair labor practice. (See International 
Longshoremen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237. 
243·244 [72 S.Ct. 235, 96 L.Ed. 275].) It could be argued 
that these provisions show a congressional willingness to take 
the risk of inconsistent application by different tribunals of 
standards bearing on labor relations for the sake of compen· 
sating injured persons. A state court awarding damages 
under section 303, however, would interpret and apply federal 
law, and its decision could be brought into harmony with board 
determinations under section 8 (b), and federal court adjudica-
tions under section 303 on review by the United States Suo 
preme Court. The danger of inconsistency would be consider. 
ably less than when recovery is under state law. 
Because of the danger of conflict in the application of state 
law with the National Labor Relations Board's application 
of the federal statute, the trial court was without jurisdiction 
to issue an injunction. I am of the opinion that for the 
same reason it was without jurisdiction to award damages. 
Furthermore, even if the federal statute does not bar an 
award of damages, plaintiffs have no cause of action under 
the established law of this state. For almost 50 years it has 
been settled that a closed or union shop is a proper objective 
of concerted labor activity because reasonably related to union 
welfare and the betterment of working conditions. This 
problem has been exhaustively considered in numerous de-
cisions of this court, and the balance of values found to 
weigh in favor of judicial self·restraint in enjoining or 
penalizing union activities reasonably calculated to achieve 
these ends. Nevertheless, a majority of this court now in 
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effect overrules these cases and abandons a policy whose 
wisdom is as clear now as it was when first adopted. 
As early as Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council 
(1908),154 Cal. 581 [98 P. 1027, 16 Ann.Cas. 1165,21 L.R.A. 
N.S. 550] this court held that it was not unlawful for a 
union to call a strike of employees and order a boycott to 
bring pressure on an employer who retained a nonunion 
worker, and thereby to enforce a closed shop. Exclusion of 
competition from nonunion workers was held a proper ob-
jective of concerted labor activity, and the court was unani-
mous in considering a strike a proper method of attaining 
thL; "nd. 
McKay 7. Retail Automobile Salesmen's Union, 16 Ca1.2d 
311, 315-325 [106 P.2d 373], presented the precise question 
in volved in the present case: " Is it lawful for a labor union 
by peaceful picketing to attempt to induce an employer to 
employ only persons who are members of the picketing union 
when there is no strike and the employees of the picketed 
employer are satisfied with their employment and do not 
desire to join the union." (See dissenting opinion at 338.) 
The court held that the objective was lawful and had a reason-
able relation to the betterment of the conditions of labor, 
thus reaffirming and extending the principle of the Parkinson 
case. Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists Union, 16 Ca1.2d 379, 
383·388 [106 P.2d 403), decided at the same time as the 
McKay case, made it clear that sections 920-923 of the Labor 
Code do not restrict the right of labor to engage in concerted 
activity to attain a closed shop. These sections were enacted 
as a result of the efforts of organized labor, and their purpose 
was to outlaw the yellow-dog contract, not the closed shop or 
union activities to obtain a closed shop. 
The reasons for permitting picketing to compel a closed 
shop even when none of the employees belong to the picketing 
union were articulated in C. S. Smith Metropolitan Market 
Co. v. Lyons, 16 Ca1.2d 389, 401 [106 P.2d 414] : "The mem-
bers of a labor organization may have a substantial interest 
in the employment relations of an employer although none 
of them is or ever has been employed by him. The reason 
for this is that the employment relations of every employer 
affect the working conditions and bargaining power of em-
ployees throughout the industry in which he competes. Hence, 
where union and nonunion employees are engaged in a 
similar occupation and their respective employers are engaged 
in trade competition one with another, the efforts of the 
) 
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union to extend its membership to the employments in which"; 
it has no foothold is not an unreasonable aim," The im· ; 
portance of attaining substantial equality in the economic 
struggle between unions and employers led to the conclusion 
that picketing to enforce a closed shop should be permitted 
notwithstanding possible injury to the employer or the non-
union worker. 
Magill Brothers, Inc. v. Building Service Ernp, Intl. Union, 
20 Ca1.2d 506, 508 [127 P.2d 542), and James v. Marinship 
Corp., 25 Ca1.2d 721, 730 [155 P.2d 329, 160 A.L.R. 900], 
restated the law as established by the earlier cases, and in, 
Park & Tilford Import Corp. v. International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters, 27 Ca1.2d 599, 604 [165 P.2d 891, 162 A.L.R. 
1426], it was declared once again, and without dissent, that 
under state law, considered alone, concerted activity for a 
closed shop is lawful even when undertaken by a union 
representing none of the employees. In Charles H. Benton, 
Inc. v. Painters Local Union No. 333, 45 Ca1.2d 677.681 [291 
P.2d 13], a decision handed down at the same time as our 
first decision in the present case, a majority of the court, 
obviously with the concurrence of those who dissented on 
other grounds, stated that, "independently of rights given 
under the federal statutes, under California decisions an 
employer may not obtain relief from economic pressure 
asserted in an effort to compel him to sign a union shop 
agreement. " This proposition was not questioned by the 
majority in their earlier opinion in the present case. 
From this review of the cases it is clear that, as to labor 
disputes to which federal law is in no way applicable, picket. 
ing to compel an employer to sign a closed shop agreement 
is picketing for a lawful purpose even when none of the 
employees are union members. Weare now told, however, 
that these cases "have been superseded, in many respects 
by later law both statutory and decisional," and that to 
"engage in the task of distinguishing and discussing them 
now would be a work of supererogation." It is true that 
the McKay ease has been superseded on its precise facts by 
the Jurisdictional Strike Act (Lab. Code, §§ 1115.1120), if 
the employees' committee there resisting the union was not 
.. financed in whole or 'in part, interfered with, dominated or 
controlled by the employer .... " (Lab. Code, § 1117.) The 
McKay case did not hold, however, as suggested by the ma-
jority opinion in the present case, that section 923 of the 
Labor Code was ineffective as against the constitutional rights 
) 
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of the defendants. Detailed discussion of section 923 \Vaq 
reserved by the majority. in the McKay case for treatment 
in Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists Union,8upra, 16 Ca1.2d 
379, decided at the same time, and as stated above, that case 
squarely held, not that sections 920-923 of the Labor Code 
were constitutionally ineffective, but that those "sections lay 
no statutory restraints upon the workers' efforts to secure 
a closed shop contract from an employer .... " (16 Ca1.2d at 
388.) The court candidly recognized that the argument 
supporting the present majority's interpretation of section 
923 had been accepted by severa] state courts, hut it ex-
pressly concluded that such argument "is not in accordance 
with the law of this state, as judicially declared for many 
years, nor is it based upon a fair construction of sections 
920 to 923 of the California Labor Code, considering their 
history and purpose." (16 Cal.2d at 388.) Moreover, the 
controlling effect of the Shafer case cannot be avoided by the 
suggestion that perhaps the employees here involved had 
selected a committee to represent them and that therefore 
the Jurisdictional Strike Act is applicable. The pleadings 
and findings are barren of any suggestion that plaintiffs are 
seeking relief under the provisions of that act, and it may 
confidently be assumed that if there were any factual basis 
for such relief, plaintiffs would not have overlooked it. Ac-
cordingly, unless federal law has changed the rule of the 
Shafer case when interstate commerce is involved, there is 
no basis in state law for an award of damages in this case. 
In Park ct Tilford Import Corp. v. International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, 27 Cal.2d 599, 603-606, 614 [165 P.2d 
891, 162 A.L.R. 1426], we grappled with the effect of ft'deral 
law on state law in this area. At the time of that decision 
the federal statute made it an unfair labor practice for an 
employer to enter into a closed shop agreement with a union 
that did not represent a majority of his employees. It was 
not an unfair labor practice, how.ever, for a union to picket 
or use other concerted activity' to comp('l an employer to 
sign such an agreement. The federal statute as then drawn 
embraced only employer unfair labor practices, and the 
National Labor Relations Board had no jurisdiction to provide 
a remedy for union con duet. We applied state law, but 
incorporated federal law. We reasoned that since under 
federal law it was unlawful for the employer to acquiesce 
in the union's demand for a closed shop, the union's demand 
and picketing in support of that demand were concerted 
) 
activities for an improper purpose. These activities were· 
unlawful as a matter of state law because state law adopted 
the federal characterization of the objective as improper. 
Much has happened in the field of labor law since our 
decision in the Park & Tilford case, especially in regard to 
the relation between state and federal law. In the Park & 
Tilford case we felt it necessary indirectly to enforce federal 
law through our own rule prohibiting concerted activity for 
an unlawful purpose, since there appeared to be no other 
way to protect federal policy from union encroachment. Sec-
tion 8(3) (now § 8(a) (3» of the federal act prohibited an 
employer from signing a closed shop agreement with a union 
that did not represent a majority of his employees, but the 
board had no authority to proceed against a union bringing 
pressure on an employer to do what the act prohibited. This 
reason for our intervention in support of federal policy was 
removed by the enactment of the Labor Management Re-
lations Act. That statute makes the union conduct itself an 
unfair labor practice subject to board control: section 8(b) (2) 
makes it an unfair labor practice to attempt to force an 
employer to violate section 8(a) (3). Thus the board is now 
fully able to assess the impact of union conduct on the federal 
policy embodied in 8(a)(3), and to vindicate that policy by 
proceeding directly against the union. 
Furthermore, decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
since the Park & Tilford case, notably Garne,. v. Teamste,., 
Union, 346 U.S. 485 [74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 228], and Weber 
v. Anheuse,..Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 [76 S.Ot. 480, 99 L.Ed. 
546], have made it clear that the definition and vindication of 
rights created by the federal act rest exclusively with the 
National Labor Relations Board. .As Mr. Justice Carter i 
pointed out in the earlier dissent in the present case, the : 
board is an integral part of the federal law, and that law is 
not intended to apply when the board is not present. (45 
Ca1.2d at 668.) Congress has not created abstract rights to be 
free from unfair labor practices; it has created rights whose 
scope and nature depend on board definition. Federal policy 
does not require vindication in state tribunals. On the con· 
trary, it requires that they not conflict with board action by 
attempting to enforce federal rights either directly, or in. 
directly by purporting to incorporate them into state law. 
Thus the very r~asons that preclude us from giving injunc-
tive relief for the violation of federal rights indicate that, 
aasuming we could give damages, we should not do 80 if we 
) 
, _./.' 
Jan. 1958] SEVEN UP BOT. Co.v. GROCERY DRIVERs UNiON '625 
[" C.2C! 11211: J20 P.2c\ "21 . 
are intelligently to apply our own unlawful purpose doctrine. 
In no meaningful sense is the purpose unlawful. 
The object of defendants' conduct in the present case is 
unlawful only if we look to federal law to characterize it as 
such. From what has been said, it is clear that there is no 
reason to do so. The policy establishing the lawfulness 
of the purpose under state law is as valid now as it was when 
this court decided the McKay, Shafer, and C. S. Smith cases. 
They should not be overruled. 
Gibson, C. J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied February 
13, 1958. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were 
of the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
